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Abstract
The monitoring and management of high-volume feature-rich traffic in large networks offers sig-
nificant challenges in storage, transmission and computational costs. The predominant approach to
reducing these costs is based on performing a linear mapping of the data to a low-dimensional subspace
such that a certain large percentage of the variance in the data is preserved in the low-dimensional
representation. This variance-based subspace approach to dimensionality reduction forces a fixed choice
of the number of dimensions, is not responsive to real-time shifts in observed traffic patterns, and is
vulnerable to normal traffic spoofing. Based on theoretical insights proved in this paper, we propose
a new distance-based approach to dimensionality reduction motivated by the fact that the real-time
structural differences between the covariance matrices of the observed and the normal traffic is more
relevant to anomaly detection than the structure of the training data alone. Our approach, called the
distance-based subspace method, allows a different number of reduced dimensions in different time
windows and arrives at only the number of dimensions necessary for effective anomaly detection. We
present centralized and distributed versions of our algorithm and, using simulation on real traffic traces,
demonstrate the qualitative and quantitative advantages of the distance-based subspace approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security professionals who monitor communication networks for malware, errors and intru-
sions are increasingly dependent on real-time detection of anomalous behavior in the data traffic
[1]. The volume of data one has to monitor and process for effective real-time management of
networks and systems, however, poses significant Big Data challenges [2]. Further, many of the
anomalies are apparent only upon an examination of the correlations in the traffic data from
multiple locations. State-of-the-art network management in multiple application scenarios today,
therefore, requires the constant monitoring of a very large number of features at hundreds of
locations across a network and the ability to collect, transmit and process the data in real-time
for near-instantaneous mitigation actions in case of anomalous patterns indicative of threats. For
example, a data center may use embedded software and hardware sensors to measure various
features of the data traffic across its hundreds of servers (along with other system states such as
temperature, humidity, response time, throughput, processor utilization, disk I/O, memory, and
other network activity) to react appropriately to anomalous events. Security administration of a
large network may involve constant monitoring of its thousands of backbone systems, routers
and links to detect a nascent denial-of-service attack or a developing outage event or a worm
about to propagate itself.
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A key step in network management and traffic analysis, therefore, is dimensionality reduction,
which cuts down the number of observed features or variables into a smaller set that is sufficient
to capture the information essential to the goals of network management. Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) is a widely used tool that allows us to derive a reduced set of the most significant
uncorrelated features that are linear combinations of the original set of features [3]. Given
N features, one selects k ≪ N most significant principal components out of N to define a
k-dimensional subspace based on observations of normal traffic (it is generally assumed that
training or some reference traffic is available for purposes of comparing the observed traffic
with it.) An underlying assumption in this approach is that a very small number of principal
components capture most of the variance in the traffic. As a result, this approach typically
chooses k as the number of principal components which capture a pre-defined percentage (say,
99%) of the variance in the normal traffic. Then, a significant deviation in the projection of the
N-dimensional observed data onto this k-dimensional reference (normal) subspace can be defined
as an anomaly for purposes of detection [4]. In this paper, we refer to this traditional approach
to employing PCA for dimensionality reduction as the variance-based subspace method.
There are at least three weaknesses of the traditional variance-based subspace approach for
anomaly detection: (i) the reduced number of principal components, k, is computed based on
the structure of normal traffic when, actually, the structure of the changes between the observed
and the normal traffic is more relevant for choosing the appropriate number of dimensions for
anomaly detection; (ii) a static determination of k is inadequate at capturing real-time changes
— the right number of dimensions is often different during different periods of time depending
on the structure of both the normal and the observed traffic; (iii) the method allows only weak
heuristics because the performance of anomaly detection is very sensitive to small changes in
the number of dimensions chosen for the normal subspace [5]. Motivated by the need to address
these weaknesses, this paper presents a new distance-based approach to dimensionality reduction
for anomaly detection based on a new metric called the maximum subspace distance. In this
paper, we refer to our approach as the distance-based subspace method.
Normal and anomalous traffic tend to differ in the correlations between pairs of features of the
traffic being monitored. These correlations, along with the variance of each monitored feature
are entries in the covariance matrix. This work is additionally motivated by two observations: (i)
anomalies lead to changes in the covariance matrix of the set of traffic features being monitored,
and (ii) different types of anomalies cause different types of deviations in the covariance matrix
allowing a categorization of the detected anomaly and an immediate prescription of actions
toward threat mitigation [6]. Besides, use of the covariance matrix requires no assumptions
about the distributions of the monitored features, rendering it a general method for traffic
characterization. Rapid detection of structural differences between two covariance matrices,
therefore, is an important goal in modern anomaly detection and is a key motivation behind
the improved method of dimensionality reduction sought in this work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the problem statement
and introduces the contributions of this paper. Section III discusses related work in the use of
covariance matrices and in subspace methods for anomaly detection. Section IV describes the
assumptions and definitions underlying the problem and the solution approach used in the paper.
Sections V and VI describe the centralized and distributed versions of our algorithms, respec-
tively. Section VII describes simulation experiments using real traffic traces which illustrate the
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advantages of anomaly detection using our distance-based subspace method. Finally, Section VIII
concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Let N denote the number of traffic features being monitored in the network. These N features
could all be observations made at a single location in the network or could be from a multiplicity
of locations where the traffic is being monitored. Assume that each feature collected or computed
from the traffic corresponds to a designated time slot. We place no assumptions on the selection
of traffic features.
The problem considered in this paper is one of finding an appropriately reduced set of k ≪ N
dimensions in real-time, which may be different during different time intervals depending on the
observed traffic at that time. The traditional approach using PCA determines k statically based
only on the training data in order to extract a normal subspace of k dimensions representative
of normal traffic, even though the best value of k may differ during different periods of time
depending on the characteristics of the observed traffic. In contrast, our distance-based subspace
method derives k based on the currently observed differential between the normal traffic deduced
from training data and the monitored/observed traffic (as opposed to deriving both k and the
normal subspace from training data alone). Before any traffic is observed, one may begin with
the choice of a pre-determined k based on training data as in traditional methods — but, as soon
as the covariance matrix of observed traffic is computed, our method allows the subsequent use
of only the number of dimensions necessary at any given time instead of a static determination
independent of current observations.
1) Centralized approach: In the case in which all N features are observations at a single
node, the covariance matrices can be readily calculated at the node itself. Also, in the case in
which the N features are observations made at multiple nodes but transmitted and collected at a
central monitoring station, the covariance matrices can be calculated at this station for analysis. In
either of these two cases, we can characterize network traffic as a stream of covariance matrices,
one for each designated window of time, and then use the observed changes in the covariance
matrices to infer changes in the system status, anomalous or otherwise. Let ΣA and ΣB denote
the two N ×N covariance matrices that need to be compared to detect changes indicative of an
anomaly. These two matrices could represent real traffic data during different time windows or
one of them could be a reference matrix representing normal operation without anomalies. The
problem becomes one of devising a measure of the structural difference using a parsimonious
metric that allows efficient computation at reasonable accuracy while also serving as a reliable
indicator of anomalies.
The contribution of this paper begins with the use of a new metric, which we call the maximum
subspace distance, defined as the largest possible angle, θmax, between the subspace composed
of the first kA principal components of ΣA and the subspace composed of the first kB principal
components of ΣB , for all possible values of kA and kB . The maximum subspace distance is
defined in more detail in Section IV.
Finding the subspace (i.e., all the principal components) given a covariance matrix is compu-
tationally expensive since it requires either singular value decomposition or eigenvalue decom-
position. By avoiding the computation of the entire subspace, by using only the most significant
principal components and by employing the theoretical insights proved in the Appendix, this
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paper contributes a fast approximate algorithm, called GETESD, to estimate a reduced number
of principal components that is sufficiently effective at distinguishing between the two matrices
being compared. This number of principal components — which we call the effective subspace
dimension (ESD) — is such that it describes each of the two subspaces enough to gain a close
estimate of the maximum subspace distance.
2) Distributed approach: In the case in which the N features are sampled at multiple locations
in the network, the covariance matrix of these features is not readily computable at any given
location. If the feature data cannot all be transmitted to a central monitoring station due to
communication costs or other reasons typical, we have only the raw features computed for every
time slot based on which we need to estimate the maximum subspace distance. Let M denote
the number of consecutive time slots for which these features have to be sampled in order to
ascertain the second-order statistics of these features, i.e., the variances and correlations which
populate the covariance matrix of these features. The input to the distributed algorithm at each
node, therefore, is not a stream of covariance matrices but raw feature data in the form of a
stream of vectors, each of length M .
To address this case, we present a distributed algorithm, called GETESD-D, which avoids
the direct computation of the covariance matrices but nevertheless returns the effective subspace
dimension and an estimate of the maximum subspace distance. The participating nodes in the
GETESD-D algorithm deploy the gossip-based Gaussian mixture learning mechanism to estimate
principal components of the traffic features [7]. The algorithm requires only local computation
and some communication between neighboring nodes. The correctness of this algorithm is proved
in the Appendix along with an analysis of its computational and communication complexity.
Besides offering new theoretical insights into comparisons between covariance matrices, our
work in this paper improves upon the traditional variance-based approaches to dimensionality
reduction in three ways: (i) our attempt to reduce the number of dimensions is based on data from
both of the two traffic streams being compared instead of depending only on some reference data
for a normal traffic stream — this allows the use of a smaller and only the number of dimensions
necessary instead of a static pre-determined number based on the training data alone, (ii) our
methods allow a dynamic real-time computation of the structural changes in network traffic
features and, therefore, allow better characterization and classification of attack traffic, and (iii)
our method makes it significantly harder for attack traffic to spoof the structure of normal traffic
in order to escape detection.
III. RELATED WORK
The problem of anomaly detection often invites customized solutions particular to the type
of anomaly that is of interest. For example, methods reported in [8] and [9] allow the detection
of load anomalies in voice-over-IP traffic at the network or the application layer. Similarly,
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are the target of detection in [10], [11] and [12].
However, given that anomalies manifest themselves in multiple and sometimes uncommon or
even unknown ways, a more practical solution to the problem of anomaly detection is a generic
method that can detect anomalies of all kinds — common and uncommon, known and unknown.
Developing general anomaly detection tools can be challenging, largely due to the difficulty of
extracting anomalous patterns from huge volumes of high-dimensional data contaminated with
anomalies. Early anomaly detection methods which used artificial intelligence, machine learning,
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or state machine modeling are reviewed in [13]. Examples of later work on developing general
anomaly detection tools include [4], [6], [12], [14]–[18]. There are two broad approaches to
anomaly detection that are related to the work reported in this paper — those using covariance
matrices directly and those using subspace methods, and occasionally those which use both these
approaches together.
While the covariance matrix plays a role in many anomaly detection methods, it was most
directly used in [6] to detect flooding attacks based on comparisons between a covariance matrix
under normal conditions (used as the reference matrix) and the observed covariance matrix. The
covariance matrix is also used directly for anomaly detection in [15]. These methods do not
necessarily compete but are complementary to the approach presented in this paper — while
they address detection, our paper primarily addresses dimensionality reduction for detection.
Given a reduced number of dimensions, one may choose any of many detection strategies which
depend very strongly on the context and the application domain. Further, as opposed to methods
in [6] and [15] which are based on detecting the changes in individual entries in the covariance
matrix, our method is additionally able to exploit the underlying correlations between the changes
in the entries to offer a more refined and a more reliable approach to anomaly detection.
The variance-based subspace method, based on PCA, was first proposed for anomaly detection
in [4] and later improved in [14] to explore the deviation in the network-wide traffic volume and
feature distributions caused by anomalies. To use this method online in real-time as described in
[4], one processes each arrival of new traffic measurements using the matrix PP T , where P is
composed of the top k principal components representing the normal traffic pattern. Therefore,
for real-time detection using this method, it is necessary to use a training dataset to determine
P before the detection process along with a certain choice of static k (as opposed to k being
determined dynamically in our distance-based subspace method.) The scheme proposed in [4]
would separate the high-dimensional space of network traffic into two subspaces: the normal
subspace and the anomalous subspace. The normal subspace is low-dimensional and captures
high variance of normal traffic data, thus modeling the normal behavior of a network. The
projections of measurement data onto the anomalous subspace are used to signal, identify and
classify anomalies.
The limitations of the variance-based subspace methods are discussed in [5]. The simulation
results in [19] further confirm that the effectiveness of the subspace method depends strongly
on the dimension chosen for the normal subspace. In addition, excessively large anomalies
can contaminate the normal subspace and weaken the performance of the detector. Later work
has improved upon the training process of the subspace method [20]–[22], but choosing the
appropriate dimension for the normal subspace has remained an unmet challenge. The distance-
based methods used in the literature also present the same challenge where the reduced number of
dimensions is not adaptive to real-time data [23]. The distance-based subspace method presented
in this paper overcomes this difficulty by allowing the number of dimensions to be based on both
the normal and the observed traffic under examination, thus adapting constantly to the changing
patterns in the observed traffic to use only the number of dimensions necessary at any given
time.
In other related work, PCA-based methods have been decentralized for a variety of purposes
including anomaly detection [24]–[28]. A distributed framework for PCA is proposed in [27] to
achieve accurate detection of network anomalies through monitoring of only the local data. A
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distributed implementation of PCA is developed for decomposable Gaussian graphical models
in [28] to allow decentralized anomaly detection in backbone networks. Distributed gossip
algorithms using only local communication for subspace estimation have been used in the context
of sensor networks [29]–[31]. Our work in this paper extends the distributed average consensus
protocol proposed in [31] to estimate the principal subspace for the context of anomaly detection
in network traffic data.
IV. THE METRIC
Let N denote the number of features in the dataset of interest and let ΣA and ΣB denote
the two N ×N covariance matrices to be compared. Let a1, . . . , aN and b1, . . . , bN denote the
eigenvectors of ΣA and ΣB , respectively. In the following, the operator symbol ‘×’ used between
two matrices or vectors denotes the matrix product.
A. The subspace distance
Let θkA,kB(A,B) denote the angle between the subspace composed of the first kA principal
components of ΣA, a1, . . . , akA , and the subspace composed of the first kB principal components
of ΣB , b1, . . . , bkB . We refer to this angle between the subspaces as the subspace distance, which
has a range between 0 to 90 degrees. We have:
sin θkA,kB(A,B) = ‖ TkA,kB(A,B) ‖ (1)
where ‖ · ‖ is the matrix norm and TkA,kB(A,B) is the part of [b1, . . . , bkB ] orthogonal to
[a1, . . . , akA]. Therefore,
TkA,kB(A,B) = (I −
kA∑
i=1
ai × a
′
i)[b1, . . . , bkB ] (2)
= (
N∑
i=kA+1
ai × a
′
i)[b1, . . . , bkB ]. (3)
The sine of the subspace distance captures the norm of [b1, . . . , bkB ] not including its projection
in [a1, . . . , akA]. The more distinguishable or orthogonal these two subspaces are to each other,
the larger the subspace distance between them.
B. The maximum subspace distance
To compare the two matrices, we quantify the difference between ΣA and ΣB as the maximum
value of the angle θkA,kB(A,B), where 1 ≤ kA ≤ N and 1 ≤ kB ≤ N :
θmax = max
1≤kA,kB≤N
θkA,kB(A,B) (4)
In this paper, we refer to θmax as the maximum subspace distance, which serves as our metric
for anomaly detection and quantifies the difference between the two matrices.
When kA and kB hold values that maximize θkA,kB(A,B), the two sets of principal compo-
nents, [a1, . . . , akA] and [b1, . . . , bkB ], can be thought of as the distinguishing characteristics of
covariance matrices ΣA and ΣB . Once the maximum subspace distance and the corresponding
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pair of dimensions are found, they can be used to characterize the two datasets with ΣA and
ΣB as their covariance matrices, and distinguish these two datasets from each other. We show
in Section VII how these two sets of characteristics can be employed for anomaly detection.
Our proposed metric of subspace distance is new, and the closest related metric in the literature
is the principal angle [32]. The subspace distance, as a metric, is different from principal angle
in several ways. Most importantly, the subspace distance considers the order in importance of
each principal component while the principal angle does not. In addition, unlike in the case of
the subspace distance, the values of the principal angles are not necessarily dependent on the
principal components.
The two sets of principal components used in the definition of the subspace distance capture
the linear correlated pattern of the two datasets. In addition, the subspace distance depends on
the order of these principal components which represents their order of importance. As a result,
our metric of the maximum subspace distance serves as a dependable measure of the magnitude
of changes in the pattern between any two datasets.
V. THE CENTRALIZED ALGORITHM
Given the high computational cost of finding the maximum subspace distance, in this section,
we present an algorithm which estimates the metric at sufficient accuracy for successful anomaly
detection. Our solution is based on four key ideas: (i) allowing kA = kB in our search for the
maximum subspace distance, θmax, (ii) reducing the problem to one of always finding only the
first principal component of a matrix, (iii) using the power iteration method to approximate the
first principal components, and finally, (iv) using a heuristic to approximately ascertain the value
of θmax.
A. The rationale behind allowing kA = kB
In the approach presented in this paper, we limit our search for θmax to only the cases in
which kA = kB . Our rationale is based on Theorem 1 below. The proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. If for some kA and kB, θkA,kB(A,B) = θmax, then there exists k, 1 ≤ k ≤ N , such
that θk,k(A,B) = θmax.
Allowing kA = kB to find the maximum subspace distance reduces the search space from N2
to N . We refer to the value of k for which θk,k(A,B) is the maximum subspace distance as the
optimal subspace dimension.
B. Subspace distance and the projection matrix
We define an N ×N projection matrix P from {b1, . . . , bN} to {a1, . . . , aN} as:
Pi,j = 〈ai, bj〉 = a′ibj (5)
where 〈·, ·〉 represents dot product of two vectors.
According to Theorem 2 below, which we prove in the Appendix, the smallest singular
value of its submatrix P1:k,1:k, consisting of the first k rows and k columns of P , is equal
to cos(θk,k(A,B)).
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Theorem 2. If an N×N matrix P is built as in Eq. (5), and its submatrix P1:k,1:k has σk(P1:k,1:k)
as its smallest singular value, then σk(P1:k,1:k) = cos(θk,k(A,B)).
To understand the result in Theorem 2, one can refer to the fact that the singular values of
a projection matrix P1:k,1:k are the scaling factors of projecting b1, . . . , bk onto a1, . . . , ak via
matrix P1:k,1:k along different axes. For example, the largest singular value of P1:k,1:k shows the
largest projection from b1, . . . , bk onto a1, . . . , ak, which results in the smallest angle between
these two subspaces. The axis in a1, . . . , ak corresponding to the largest singular value is most
parallel to b1, . . . , bk. Similarly, the smallest singular value results in an axis in a1, . . . , ak that
is most orthogonal to b1, . . . , bk, and the resulting angle is the exact definition of the subspace
angle.
It can be shown, as stated in Theorem 3 below, that by increasing the subspace dimension k,
the largest projection from b1, . . . , bk onto a1, . . . , ak is non-decreasing with k and has 1 as its
maximum value. In other words, the axis in a1, . . . , ak becomes more parallel to b1, . . . , bk with
increasing k.
Theorem 3. If an N×N matrix P is built as in Eq. (5), and its submatrix P1:k,1:k has σk(P1:k,1:k)
as its smallest singular value and σ1(P1:k,1:k) as its largest singular value, then:
σ1(P1:k−1,1:k−1) ≤ σ1(P1:k,1:k), k = 2, . . . , N (6)
σ1(P1:k,1:k) ≤ 1, k = 1, . . . , N (7)
The proof of Theorem 3 is in the Appendix. The results in Eqs. (6) and (7) indicate that
when σ1(P1:k,1:k) is already close enough to 1, further increasing the number of principal
components can only slightly increase the ability to differentiate between the two subspaces
using the maximum subspace distance as the metric.
C. Estimating the optimal subspace dimension
Based on our results as stated in Theorems 1–3, we develop an estimation algorithm for
the optimal subspace dimension. It is straightforward to find the optimal subspace dimension
by obtaining a1, . . . , aN and b1, . . . , bN first, computing θk,k(A,B) for every k from 1 to N
and determining the k for which θk,k(A,B) is the maximum. However, we are interested in a
less computationally expensive method that does not require full knowledge of a1, . . . , aN and
b1, . . . , bN . Furthermore, our interest is in searching for a smaller k, which we refer to as the
effective subspace dimension (ESD), corresponding to a subspace distance close enough to the
maximum such that this value of k is sufficiently effective at distinguishing between the two
subspaces.
Our algorithm, which we call the GETESD algorithm, relies on the results stated in Theo-
rems 1-3. Firstly, because of Theorem 1, we are able to limit our search of the optimal subspace
dimension to cases in which kA = kB = k. Secondly, since the values of subspace distance,
θk,k(A,B), depend on singular values of submatrix P1:k,1:k, as stated in Theorem 2, we can
compute the subspace distance θk,k(A,B) with only the knowledge of the first k eigenvectors
of ΣA and ΣB . In other words, if we have already tried values of k from 1 to K, the pair of
(K + 1)-th eigenvectors is all the additional information we need to get θK+1,K+1(A,B).
Finally, because of the property of singular values of submatrix P1:k,1:k, as stated in Theorem 3,
σ1(P1:k,1:k) is non-decreasing to 1. The closer σ1(P1:k,1:k) is to 1, the less distinguishable these
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two subspaces become. As a result, we set a threshold on σ1(P1:k,1:k), and stop the algorithm
when σ1(P1:k,1:k) is above the threshold 1 − ǫ. Of course, a higher threshold leads to a wider
search range and a closer approximation of the optimal subspace dimension.
Overall, our algorithm computes an approximate value of θk,k(A,B) beginning with k = 1
and increases k at each step; the algorithm stops when the subspace distance, θk,k(A,B), has
dropped and the largest singular value of P1:k,1:k is in a pre-defined neighborhood of 1. This
observed θk,k(A,B) is used as the estimated maximum subspace distance and the corresponding
k becomes the effective subspace dimension.
Fig. 1 presents the pseudo-code of our algorithm, GETESD, which returns ESD, the effective
subspace dimension, and θmax, the estimated maximum subspace distance, given two covariance
matrices, ΣA and ΣB , and ǫ, which defines the threshold at which the algorithm stops. Note
that the k-th eigenvectors of ΣA and ΣB are not computed until we are in the k-th iteration
of the while loop. Our implementation of this algorithm uses the power iteration method
[33]. For each iteration in our algorithm, we add one row and one column to the projection
matrix along with the updated pair of eigenvectors. During the k-th iteration of the while loop,
we compute ak and bk, i.e., the k-th eigenvectors of ΣA and ΣB , using the power iteration
method. We then construct P1:k,1:k by adding row vector [a′kb1, . . . , a′kbk−1] to the bottom of
P1:k−1,1:k−1, and column vector [a′1b′k, . . . , a′kb′k] to the right. We then use the power iteration
method again to calculate the singular values σ1(P1:k,1:k) and σk(P1:k,1:k). The algorithm is run
until the aforementioned stopping criteria is met.
The GETESD algorithm achieves a significantly higher accuracy over our previous work, a
heuristic [34]. As reported in [34], the heuristic is able to estimate the subspace distance with
a percentage error which frequently reaches above 1% and sometimes close to 5%. For the
same data, however, the percentage error using the GETESD algorithm never exceeds 0.051%,
a significant improvement.
D. Complexity analysis
By the naive approach, we would first calculate the two sets of eigenvectors and then the
subspace distance for every possible pair of (kA, kB) to ascertain the maximum subspace dis-
tance. The complexity of calculating the two sets of eigenvectors is O(N3). The complexity of
calculating the subspace distance for every possible pair of (kA, kB) is N2 ∗ O(N3) = O(N5).
The computational complexity of the naive method which computes all eigenvectors to find the
optimal subspace dimension, therefore, is O(N5).
Theorem 4 states the computational complexity of the GETESD algorithm.
Theorem 4. The GETESD algorithm in Fig. 1 for N nodes has a computational complexity of
O(Zk3+k2N), where k is the resulting effective subspace dimension and Z is the upper bound
on the number of iterations in the power method.
We prove Theorem 4 in the Appendix. This shows that the GETESD algorithm is significantly
more computationally efficient compared with the naive method which computes the exact
optimal subspace dimension. If a variance-based approach were to be used in each time window
to dynamically compute the number of dimensions, the time complexity (determined by having to
compute the full eigenvector) would be O(N3), significantly higher than that for the GETESD
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procedure GETESD(ΣA , ΣB , ǫ)
k ← 1 ⊲ number of Principal Components (PCs)
θ ← 0 ⊲ angle between two subspaces
ΣˆA ← ΣA ⊲ projection of ΣA on its last N − k PCs
ΣˆB ← ΣB ⊲ projection of ΣB on its last N − k PCs
θmax ← 0 ⊲ maximum angle observed
ESD ← 0 ⊲ value of k corresponding to θmax
while (k ≤ N) do
ak ← estimated first PC of ΣˆA ⊲ k-th PC of ΣA
bk ← estimated first PC of ΣˆB ⊲ k-th PC of ΣB
construct P ′1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k
σ1(P1:k,1:k)←
√
λ1(P ′1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k)
σk(P1:k,1:k)←
√
λk(P
′
1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k)
θ′ ← arccos(σk(P1:k,1:k))
if (θ′ < θ & σ1(P1:k,1:k) > 1− ǫ) then
return (ESD, θmax)
end if
if (θ > θmax) then
θmax ← θ
ESD ← k
end if
ΣˆA ← ΣˆA − ak × (a
′
k × ΣˆA)
ΣˆB ← ΣB − bk × (b′k × ΣˆB)
k ← k + 1
θ← θ′
end while
return (ESD, θmax)
end procedure
Fig. 1. The GETESD algorithm: An efficient algorithm for finding an effective subspace dimension (ESD) and the corresponding
estimate of the maximum subspace distance between the two given matrices, ΣA and ΣB .
algorithm. We will demonstrate in Section VII that the approximate result computed by the
GETESD algorithm suffices to detect anomalies.
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procedure AVERAGECONSENSUS(xn ,W )
m
(0)
n ← xn ⊲ initialize estimate
k ← 0 ⊲ step
for k = 1 : S do
sends m(k)n to its neighbors
receives m(k)i from its neighbors, i ∈ Neighbor(n)
m
(k+1)
n ←
∑
i∈Neighbor(n)Wn,im
(k)
i
end for
return m(k)n
end procedure
Fig. 2. The average consensus procedure.
VI. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
When a multiplicity of points in a network are being monitored for anomalies, the data required
for the computation of covariance matrices has to be collected at multiple nodes, some of them
geographically distant from each other. The centralized algorithm in Section V would require
a monitoring station to collect all the data from the collection nodes, compute the covariance
matrices, and then process the stream of matrices for anomalies. The prohibitive logging and
communication costs in this case form the motivation behind our distributed algorithm to allow
an estimation of the maximum subspace distance without a central station.
In the distributed case, no node can possess the knowledge of the entire covariance matrix
(which requires all of the data from all of the nodes) but each node can update and maintain its
corresponding entry in the eigenvector. As a result, each node will need to collaborate with its
neighbors to perform eigenvector/eigenvalue estimation in a distributed fashion.
A. Assumptions and system model
Let N be the total number of features being monitored. In practice, different nodes will have
different numbers of features to monitor. However, for purposes of simplicity and clarity, we
will illustrate our distributed algorithm assuming there is one feature monitored at each node —
so, in this section, we will also assume that there are N nodes. As described in Section II-2, let
M denote the number of consecutive time slots for which each of these N features is sampled to
compute a covariance matrix (any two features have to be observed for a certain length of time
to ascertain the correlation between them). The input to the distributed algorithm, therefore, is
a stream of vectors of length M each, with each entry being a feature sampled at a certain time
slot.
Collectively, these vectors form an N ×M matrix, X , with data collection of the n-th feature
xn available only at node n (here, xn is the n-th row of raw data). For an eigenvector v of X ,
vn is estimated and stored at the n-th node.
We also assume a weighted connection matrix W associated with an undirected graph com-
posed of these N nodes. Besides a self-loop for each node, an edge exists between any two
nodes as long as they can communicate with each other directly (we make no assumptions on
the protocol layer for this communication, although the detection algorithm will achieve better
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procedure POWERITERATION(C, ǫ)
v(0) ← randomly chosen N × 1 vector ⊲ initialize
k ← 0 ⊲ step
while True do
v(k+1) ← Cv(k)
if ‖ v(k+1) − v(k) ‖< ǫ then
return v(k+1)/ ‖ v(k+1) ‖
end if
k ← k + 1
end while
end procedure
Fig. 3. The centralized power iteration procedure.
performance at the IP layer than at the application layer). Each edge is associated with a weight,
and the total weight of all edges connected to the same node is one. This makes the column
sums and row sums of W equal to one.
We also make use of a distributed routine to compute the average of certain values at all nodes
but one which runs only locally at each node. This routine, a straightforward extension of the
distributed average consensus algorithm in [31] to accommodate for the constraints placed on
row sums and column sums of W , is shown in Fig. 2. If each of the N nodes holds the value
xn, n = 1, . . . , N , this routine computes the average m = 1N
∑N
n=1 xn at each node locally.
B. Distributed power iteration method
The goal of a distributed power iteration method is to allow nodes that are remotely located
to cooperate in their estimation of the most significant principal component of a dataset. Fig. 3
presents the pseudo-code for a centralized power iteration method which estimates the first
principal component v given a covariance matrix C. The method rests on the fact that the first
eigenvalue of a given matrix C can be estimated by limk→∞ C
kv
‖Ckv‖ , where v is a random vector.
We refer readers to [33] for more details about the power iteration method.
In the following, we develop and describe a distributed version of the power iteration method.
First, we describe how power iteration can be performed without involving the covariance matrix
C. In the k-th step of the centralized power iteration method shown in Fig. 3, v(k+1) needs to
be updated by multiplying with C. In the absence of C, v(k+1) can be computed as
v(k+1) = Cv(k) =
1
M − 1
XX ′v(k)
=
1
M − 1
X [x′1 . . . x
′
N ]v
(k) =
1
M − 1
X
N∑
i=1
x′iv
(k)
i
The n-th entry of the estimated principal component at (k + 1)-th step is:
v(k+1)n =
1
M − 1
xnz
(k) (8)
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procedure POWERITERATION-D(xn, xˆn, ǫ)
v
(0)
n ← randomly chosen value ⊲ initialize
k ← 0 ⊲ step
while True do
z(k) ← N × AverageConsensus(x′nv
(k)
n ,W )
v
(k+1)
n ← 1M−1 xˆnz
(k)
e
(k)
n ← AverageConsensus((v(k+1)n − v(k)n )2,W )
if e(k)n < ǫ then
ln ← AverageConsensus((v(k+1)n )2,W )
return 1√
ln
v
(k+1)
n
end if
k ← k + 1
end while
end procedure
Fig. 4. The distributed power iteration method.
where z(k) =
∑N
n=1 x
′
nv
(k)
n . Since the n-th node has access to xn and x′nv
(k)
n , it is able to compute
v
(k+1)
n after it uses the average consensus process to get z(k). The norm of v(k) and v(k+1)− v(k)
can be achieved by applying average consensus on (v(k)n )2 and (v(k+1)n − v(k)n )2.
Our distributed version of the power iteration method is shown in Fig. 4. Note that the input
to this algorithm is xn, raw data visible to the node running the algorithm, with the method
requiring no knowledge of covariance matrix C. Besides xn, the algorithm takes an additional
input, xˆn, which we explain in Section VI-D. For now, it suffices to know that xˆn = xn for the
estimation of vn. The estimated principal component is normalized before it is returned, and
each node only needs to estimate one entry of v(k) in each step.
C. Evaluation of convergence and accuracy
In this subsection, we briefly report on the convergence of the distributed power iteration
method and its accuracy. We use real data traffic traces — anonymized passive traffic traces
from one of CAIDA’s monitors on high-speed Internet backbone links, equinix-chicago-dirA
[35]. Use of real traffic traces allows an examination of the algorithms in real contexts where
there is always some degree of both noise and unmarked anomalies present in the data.
We consider the histogram of packet sizes and protocol of the packets flowing over a single
link within an interval of 25ms. We use 75 bins for packet sizes and 4 for protocol types, leading
to a feature vector of length 79. For the trace lasting 1 minute, we obtain around 2400 examples
of the feature vectors and use them to calculate a covariance matrix of these 79 features.
For lack of publicly available traffic traces paired with a large network graph, we now lay
this dataset on a simulated network graph composed of 79 nodes, generated using the scale-free
Baraba´si–Albert (BA) model where, after initialization, each new node added to the network is
attached to 2 existing nodes. To clearly isolate the performance of the distributed power iteration
method, we assume a simple scenario with each node responsible for the collection of one type
of feature and the computation of one histogram. The weights for edges, including self loops,
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Fig. 5. Error of the estimated principal component using distributed power iteration using different numbers of iterations in the
distributed power iteration method. The errors are reported in terms of two metrics: the projection bias and the mean squared
error (MSE). Note that the error after convergence (at iteration 12 and beyond) is the same as the error with the centralized
version.
are randomly chosen to satisfy the requirement that the weight matrix has unit row sums and
unit column sums.
Since the family of average consensus algorithms is already well-studied [31], we focus here
on the distributed power iteration method assuming that the distributed average consensus method
generates an answer within an error margin of 5%.
We use two metrics to evaluate the estimation result of our algorithm for distributed power
iteration. The first, projection bias, quantifies the bias of the estimated principal component in
the direction of the actual principal component. The second metric, mean squared error (MSE),
quantifies the closeness of the estimate to the actual principal component. Fig. 5 shows these
metrics for the distributed power iteration method using simulation results for varying numbers
of iterations.
Since the actual principal component is not available to our algorithm, it does not know
to stop when both the projection bias and MSE are the lowest (as at iteration 7 in Fig. 5),
but continues on to converge to some value other than the better answer it had already found.
However, the algorithm does converge at an estimate which is the same as that estimated by
the centralized version when all of the data is available to all the nodes (in our example in
Fig. 5, this happens after iteration 12.) Since the centralized version of our algorithm also stops
at an approximation, neither of the two versions arrives at exactly the correct answer but they
both achieve a very low error in their estimates. Note that Fig. 5 also offers a comparison in
the accuracy achieved by the centralized and the distributed versions, since the estimation of
the principal component is what differentiates the GETESD and GETESD-D algorithms. The
accuracy of the distributed GETESD-D algorithm given enough iterations to allow convergence
of distributed power iteration is the same as the accuracy achieved by the centralized GETESD
algorithm.
While the number of required iterations depends on the threshold for the stopping condition,
we find that, on average, the result converges after around 10 distributed power iterations and that
an equivalent or better result is achieved with as few as 6 iterations. Fig. 5 also shows that the
estimated principal component is almost in the same direction as the actual principal component
with a mean squared error below 1%. Finally, it is worth noting that by exploiting results from
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iterations in previous time windows, one can effectively reduce the number of iterations per time
window to an average of 1.
D. The GETESD-D algorithm
In this section, we present the GETESD-D algorithm, the decentralized implementation of our
algorithm in Fig. 1. In each iteration of the while loop, the first principal component and the
corresponding eigenvalue are estimated by the distributed power iteration method.
After obtaining ak and bk, P1:k,1:k can be constructed as follows. Since Pi,j =
∑N
n=1 ai(n)bj(n),
entries of row vector [a′kb1, . . . , a′kbk−1] and column vector [a′1bk, . . . , a′kbk]′ can be calculated
by calling the distributed algorithm for average consensus on ai(n)bj(n). Then we can add the
row vector [a′kb1, . . . , a′kbk−1] to the bottom of P1:k−1,1:k−1, and column vector [a′1bk, . . . , a′kbk]′
to its right to construct P1:k,1:k.
Note that at the end of each while loop of Fig. 1, the part corresponding to ak and bk are
subtracted from covariance matrices ΣˆA and ΣˆB . Without the subtraction, the eigenvector v(k+1)
can be equivalently estimated using distributed power iteration as follows. Let ak be the estimate
for the k-th eigenvector of dataset X , then
v(k+1) = (C − aka
′
kC)v
(k)
= Cv(k) −
1
M − 1
aka
′
kXX
′v(k)
= Cv(k) −
1
M − 1
ak
(
N∑
i=1
ak(i)xi
)(
N∑
j=1
x′nv
(k)
n
)
= Cv(k) −
1
M − 1
ak
(
N∑
i=1
ak(i)xi
)
z(k),
where z(k) is defined as in Eq. (8). In particular, the n-th entry of the eigenvector v(k+1) can be
estimated by:
v(k+1)n =
(
Cv(k)
)
n
−
1
M − 1
ak(n)
(
N∑
i=1
ak(i)xi
)
z(k)
=
1
M − 1
xnz
(k) −
1
M − 1
ak(n)
(
N∑
i=1
ak(i)xi
)
z(k)
=
1
M − 1
(xn − ak(n)f(ak, X))z
(k)
where f(ak, X) =
∑N
i=1 ak(i)xi. As a result, a copy of the readings at node n, denoted by xˆn,
can be updated using xn − ak(n)f(ak, X) to allow equivalent estimation as in Fig. 1.
The distributed algorithm that combines the aforementioned computations is shown in Fig. 6.
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procedure GETESD-D(xn, yn, ǫ)
k ← 1 ⊲ number of Principal Components (PCs)
θ ← 0 ⊲ angle between two subspaces
θmax ← 0 ⊲ maximum angle observed
xˆn ← xn ⊲ copy of xn
yˆn ← yn ⊲ copy of yn
ESD ← 0 ⊲ value of k corresponding to θmax
while (k ≤ N) do
ak(n)← POWERITERATION-D(xn, xˆn, ǫ)
bk(n)← POWERITERATION-D(yn, yˆn, ǫ)
construct P ′1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k
σ1(P1:k,1:k)←
√
λ1(P
′
1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k)
σk(P1:k,1:k)←
√
λk(P ′1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k)
θ′ ← arccos(σk(P1:k,1:k))
if (θ′ < θ & σ1(P1:k,1:k) > 1− ǫ) then
return (ESD, θmax)
end if
if (θ > θmax) then
θmax ← θ
ESD ← k
end if
fX ← AVERAGECONSENSUS(ak(n)xn,W )
xˆn ← xˆn − ak(n)fX
fY ← AVERAGECONSENSUS(bk(n)yn,W )
yˆn ← yˆn − bk(n)fY
k ← k + 1
θ← θ′
end while
return (ESD, θmax)
end procedure
Fig. 6. The distributed algorithm, GETESD-D running at node n to find an effective subspace dimension (ESD) and the
corresponding estimate of the maximum subspace distance between the two given datasets, X and Y .
E. Complexity analysis
Theorem 5 below, proved in the Appendix, addresses the computational complexity the GETESD-
D algorithm.
Theorem 5. The computational complexity of GETESD-D is O(kpM∆S) for M measurements
at each node, where S and p are upper bounds on the number of steps it takes for the convergence
of average consensus and the GETESD-D methods, respectively.
Note that in a central setting, the computational cost for calculating covariance matrix is
O(N2M), and is O(ZN2) for Z steps of the power method. The messages with information
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about principal components to all nodes would be O(N3) in the best case and O(N4) in the
worst case.
Theorem 6 below, also proved in the Appendix, addresses the communication complexity the
GETESD-D algorithm.
Theorem 6. The communication complexity of GETESD-D is O(kM∆+kp∆S) for M measure-
ments at each node in a network with a maximum degree of ∆, where S and p are upper bounds
on the number of steps it takes for the convergence of average consensus and the GETESD-D
methods, respectively.
Note that the number of steps for the average consensus process, S, depends on the ratio of
λ2(W )/λ1(W ), the second and first eigenvalues of W : a smaller ratio results in a smaller S. For
a sparse graph, such a condition can be easily met. Similarly, the upper bound on the number
of iterations in the distributed power method, p, relies on the ratio of λ2(C)/λ1(C), the second
and first eigenvalues of C. In our tests with CAIDA traffic data [35], the ratio is as small as
3E–4, which means that only a couple of iterations for a 7000-dimensional dataset are enough
to reach convergence.
VII. EFFECTIVENESS OF ANOMALY DETECTION
Assume the dimension of data is N . Using training data, a normal subspace Uk is then con-
structed with the top k ≪ N principal components. Since most of the normal traffic patterns lie
within the normal subspace Uk, projections of data with no anomalies onto the normal subspace
should retain most of the data. However, projections of anomalous data, whose characteristics do
not fall entirely within the aforementioned normal subspace, would retain only a portion of the
observed data. Therefore, for purposes of anomaly detection using the variance-based subspace
method, the projection residual of any given length-N vector x, denoted by r(x), is calculated
as follows to yield a metric of the anomaly:
r(x) = ‖ (I − UkU
T
k )x ‖,
where I is the identity matrix. The detection process simply compares the projection residual
with a pre-defined threshold and triggers an alarm if it is above the threshold [14].
The projection residual is the residual of the data after it has been projected onto the normal
subspace: if the data is normal, the projection residual should be small relative to the case when
the data consists of anomalies. In this paper, we will use the projection residual as a measure of
the degree of anomalousness in the traffic. Note that in the distributed scenario, the projection
residual can be computed at each node by calling the average consensus method on Uk(n, :)xn.
A. Anomaly detection using the projection residual
To test our distance-based subspace approach for anomaly detection, we need labeled traffic
data with connections that are already identified as either normal or anomalous. We use the
Kyoto2006+ dataset, which includes 24 features of raw traffic data obtained by honeypot systems
deployed at Kyoto University [36]. Traffic features include, among others, source/destination IP
address and port numbers of a connection, its duration, and bytes that are received/sent. Four
additional features are included for each connection, indicating whether the session is part of an
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Fig. 7. A comparison of projection residuals when the normal subspace dimension is determined by the GETESD algorithm
(distance-based) and by the variance-based subspace method (variance-based). The dimension used in the variance-based method
is the number required to capture 99.5% of the variance.
attack or not. In our simulation, we use these 4 features for verification and the other 20 features
for data analysis.
Since raw features often show low correlation for useful anomaly detection, we extract the
entropy of each traffic feature within non-overlapping time windows and use the length-20
entropy vector for each time window as the new traffic feature. In the dataset, there are about
100 new connections every minute, with most connections lasting around 1 minute. As a result,
we use a time window lasting 5 minutes and extract the entropy of around 500 connections
in each time window. The choice of a window size for optimal effectiveness depends not only
on the traffic intensity but also on the features being monitored — extracting some features
may require more traffic history than certain others. However, a larger window size need not
increase the delay in anomaly detection, except upon start-up. To detect anomalies as rapidly
as possible, one can use our algorithms with sliding (overlapping) time windows to update the
sample covariance matrix and run the detection every time the window moves.
In subspace methods, we use training data to construct a subspace consisting of its first
few principal components, which is assumed to be the normal subspace. We then project the
observed/test data, which may contain varying numbers of anomalous connections at any given
time, onto this normal subspace. This yields the projection residual, our metric of anomalousness.
In our experiments using the labeled Kyoto data, we generate the training data using only the
connections that are not labeled as anomalous. The test data, on the other hand, contains a
varying number of anomalous connections.
Fig. 7 plots the projection residual of both the training data and the test data, using both the
variance-based and the distance-based subspace methods. In case of the variance-based approach,
we use the number of dimensions required to capture 99.5% of the variance in the training data
as the number of dimensions for the normal subspace. In case of the distance-based approach,
for each test dataset (comprised of multiple time windows), we derive a new effective subspace
dimension (ESD) to serve as the dimension of the normal subspace. In Fig. 7, the number of
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Fig. 8. Plots of ROC as a result of the variance-based and distance-based subspace method. Here, the normal subspace
dimension in the distance-based subspace method is 8. The normal subspace dimension in the variance-based method is 11 and
captures 99.5% variance.
dimensions of normal subspace used for the projections is 11 in the case of the variance-based
approach and a lower number, 8, in the case of our distance-based approach. As Fig. 7 shows,
through qualitative observation, that both the variance-based and the distance-based subspace
methods are able to distinguish between test data (which contains anomalous connections) and
the training data (which contains no anomalous connections).
B. Hit rate and false alarm rate
To evaluate our distance-based algorithm for anomaly detection, we use the Receiver oper-
ating characteristic (ROC) metric to characterize the number of anomalous datapoints in the
Kyoto2006+ dataset that can be detected using the variance-based and distance-based subspace
method. We compare the projection residual of the Kyoto2006+ dataset with a threshold, and use
the resulting hit rate and the false alarm rate (or the false positive rate) to make a quantitative
assessment of the effectiveness of anomaly detection. The hit rate is defined as the percentage of
anomalous connections whose projection residual exceeds a certain threshold. The false alarm
rate is defined as the percentage of non-anomalous connections whose projection residual exceeds
the threshold. The hit rate and false alarm rate varies when the threshold changes.
We illustrate the comparative performance of variance-based and distance-based subspace
methods using ROCs in two ways. Note that, as shown in Fig. 7, the projection residuals between
the anomalous connections and the normal connections are distinctive for both of these two
subspace methods. As a result, we can achieve 100% hit rate with zero false alarm rate when
a proper threshold is used for detection (between 2.33 and 2.70 for the variance-based method,
and between 6.69 and 7.03 for the distance-base method.) Fig. 8 shows the ROC comparison
between the variance-based and distance-based subspace methods for various thresholds in this
range. The results show that the distance-based subspace method achieves a better performance
since it yields the same hit rate and false alarm rates even though it uses a reduced number of
dimensions (8 compared to 11.)
A second way to compare ROCs is by choosing a threshold such that the false alarm rate is
fixed at a certain percentage, say 1%, and then make comparisons between the hit rate under
variance-based and distance-based methods. Fig. 9 shows the resulting hit rate corresponding to
different numbers of normal subspace dimensions when the false alarm rate is fixed at 1%. When
the normal subspace dimension lies between 8 and 14, the hit rate is 100%. However, when the
number of dimensions used for the normal subspace lies outside this range, the performance
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Fig. 9. The achieved hit rate (as a percentage) when the false alarm rate is fixed at 1% plotted on the Y-axis against the number
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Fig. 10. A comparison of the running time for computing the projection residuals using the distance-based and variance-based
subspace methods.
is worse. In the variance-based subspace method, the normal subspace dimension used for
projections and, consequently, the hit rate, can vary significantly with the choice of the percentage
of variance in the training data that the normal subspace is designed to capture (as suggested by
Fig. 9). On the other hand, the distance-based subspace method depends on the structural changes
in the test data and uses the smallest number of dimensions that achieves good performance (as
also suggested by Fig. 9).
Thes results in Figs. 8 and 9 demonstrate a key advantage of the distance-based subspace
method over the variance-based subspace methods. Instead of using a pre-set number of di-
mensions based only on the training data, the distance-based approach uses only the number of
dimensions that approximately maximizes the distinction between the test data and the normal
subspace. For this real-traffic trace, the variance-based approach may use as many as 14 (in
this example, it uses 11 to capture 99.5% of the variance), while the distance-based approach
uses only 8 dimensions with no appreciable reduction in the hit rate. The advantage lies in
the fact that, unlike the variance-based approach, the distance-based approach can adapt to the
characteristics of the test data to use only the number of dimensions necessary.
The benefit of using only the number of dimensions necessary is the ability to achieve a reduced
runtime without compromising anomaly detection. To show this advantage of the distance-
based method for real-time detection, we evaluate the average running time for computing the
projection residual for the distance-based and variance-based subspace methods. The simulation
was implemented in MATLAB and executed on a server equipped with an AMD Athlon II
3.0 GHz processor. Using synthetic datasets with increasing number of dimensions, we show in
Fig. 10 that as the dimension of the dataset increases, the distance-based method is more efficient
in reducing the overhead of computing the projection residual. More specifically, the runtime
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Fig. 11. A comparison of the anomalous rate with the projection residuals using the distance-based and variance-based subspace
methods.
with the distance-based method is less than half that with variance-based method as the number
of features in the dataset approaches 5000, a very realistic scenario in network management.
C. Information content of residuals
Besides the real-time adaptability, the distance-based subspace approach offers a second key
advantage over the variance-based approach — the projection residual in the distance-based
approach carries more useful information toward successful anomaly detection. To illustrate
this, we will use the labels (which identify a connection as part of attack traffic or not) in the
Kyoto dataset to calculate the percentage of anomalous connections within each time window,
and refer to this percentage as the anomalous rate.
Fig. 11 offers a comparison between the projection residual computed for each time window in
the test data with the anomalous rate within the same time window. One interesting and illustrative
observation that emerges is that, in general, the anomalous rate tends to somewhat track the
projection residual but not consistently. A sharp and prolonged increase in the anomalous rate
during time windows 55–65 leads to a reduced projection residual in the case of distance-based
approach, while in the case of variance-based approach, there is no appreciable change.
For a deeper understanding of this phenomenon, we examined each of the principal compo-
nents of the test data and the normal subspace in the time windows 55–65. The second and the
ninth principal components of the training data are pertinent here and projections of the test data
on these principal components are plotted in Fig. 12. In time windows with a high anomalous
rate, we find that the anomalous patterns are largely along the second principal component of
the normal subspace. However, it also deviates from the normal subspace in the less significant
principal components, as shown in the figure for the ninth principal component.
The variance-based approach, because of its static use of the number of dimensions based only
on training data, does not offer any hint of the rise in anomalous traffic through the projection
residual. The distance-based approach, on the other hand, shows a sudden change in the projection
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Fig. 12. Projection of the test data along the second and the ninth principal components of the normal subspace.
residual offering the potential for a richer set of heuristics for anomaly detection. The distance-
based subspace method, by capturing more information about the test data in its dimensionality
reduction, also transfers some of this information into the pattern of changes in the projection
residual.
Heuristics for anomaly detection can be further enhanced in the case of distance-based sub-
space method because the algorithm, in the process of computing the effective subspace di-
mension, also computes the principal components of the test data. Periodic analysis of these
principal components can offer deeper insights into anomalous behavior and can, in fact, as
shown in Section VII-D, even help detect malicious traffic which tries to mimic normal traffic
in its principal components.
D. Overcoming normal traffic spoofing
Just like cryptographers are required to assume that attackers have knowledge of the crypto-
graphic algorithm, system security engineers have to assume that attackers will have knowledge
of the normal subspace used for anomaly detection. We define a traffic spoofing attack as
one in which an attacker deliberately engineers the profile of the anomalous traffic so that
its most significant principal components align with those of the normal subspace. The variance-
based approach, because its dimensionality reduction is based only on the normal subspace, is
vulnerable to this type of spoofing attack. The distance-based approach, however, is able to resist
this attack better; because of its dependence on the principal components of the test data, an
attacker needs to spoof not just the principal components of the normal subspace but also in the
right order, which presents the attacker a higher hurdle to cross.
Suppose an anomaly detection system uses the histogram of packet sizes and protocols as
traffic features. In order to launch a denial-of-service attack that evades detection, the attacker
can design the size of attack packets such that the attack traffic follows a subset of the principal
components in the normal subspace. But, assume that the order of the principal components of
the attack traffic differ from those of the normal traffic, since preserving the order would be a
more difficult feat for an attacker.
Suppose the normal dataset (BEFORE), without any anomalies, has N ×N covariance matrix
ΣB = UΛBU
′
, where the principal components are given by U = V ′ = [u1, . . . , uN ] with random
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Fig. 13. Projection residual of test data without any injected anomalies (Top, dataset BEFORE) and with injected anomalies
which spoof the principal components of the normal subspace (Bottom, dataset AFTER)
orthonormal columns, and ΛB is a diagonal matrix. Assume that the variance-based method uses
a threshold percentage of captured variance such that all four of these principal components are
in the normal subspace. Using 99.5% as the minimum variance that should be captured in the
variance-based approach, the normal subpace dimension with the variance-based approach is 8.
Assume the injected anomalous traffic behaves as the 4-th principal component in the normal
subspace, and the resulting covariance matrix (AFTER) becomes ΣA = V ΛAV ′, where ΛA is
also a diagonal matrix. Let the principal components of ΣA be given by V = [v1, . . . , vN ], and
vn =


u4 if n = 3
u3 if n = 4
un otherwise.
In other words, the injected anomalous traffic changes the order of importance of these two
principal components, u3 and u4, both of which resides in the normal subspace.
Upon simulation of this setting, we find that the effective subspace dimension using the
distance-based method is 3. Fig. 13 presents the projection residual before and after such
anomalous traffic is injected. One thing we observe from Fig. 13 is that because the anomalous
data resides in the normal subspace, there is no substantive difference between the projection
residual of normal data and anomalous data (BEFORE and AFTER) when using the variance-
based subspace method. This confirms that the variance-based subspace method is not able to
detect the anomaly that exploits normal traffic spoofing.
On the other hand, the projection residual with the distance-based subspace method shows a
distinct qualitative difference and a larger value with anomalous traffic. Besides showing that
this detection is possible with only 3 dimensions (while the variance-based approach uses 8
dimensions without being able to detect it), the distance-based approach also offers additional
information for classification or mitigation. The GETESD algorithm computes, along with the
effective subspace dimension, the most significant principal components of the test traffic which
can be examined for a deeper look into the anomaly identified by the higher projection residual.
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TABLE I
COST OF ALGORITHMS GETESD (AT THE MONITORING STATION) AND GETESD-D (AT EACH NODE).
Metric N Algorithm
GETESD GETESD-D
Runtime for
detection (secs)
100 8.36e-5 1.22e-4
1000 3.50e-3 1.14e-2
Communication
cost of detection
100 5.97 KB 400 B
1000 85.64 KB 560 B
Storage cost
of detection
100 78.12 KB 0.78 KB
1000 7.63 MB 7.81 KB
In this case, one may be able to observe that the order of the principal components has changed
in the test data and that the anomalous traffic may be attempting to spoof normal traffic.
E. Comparison of centralized and distributed algorithms
In this subsection, we offer a comparison between the performance of the centralized (GETESD)
and distributed (GETESD-D) versions of our algorithm. Note that both of these versions yield
the same mathematical output — that is, they achieve the same accuracy and, therefore, the
same level of success in anomaly detection. Table I summarizes the comparisons for detecting
an anomaly using the same workstation as in Fig. 10 for our simulations. For our simulations,
we use synthetic networks modeled after realistic campus-wide WiFi backbones, with N = 100
and N = 1000 and 1Gbps links.
The detection time shown in Table I is the total worst-case runtime for computing the projection
residual of each data vector for detection (in the distributed case, different nodes may converge to
the answer at different times). As one might expect in a distributed algorithm in which detection
steps begin with incomplete information until convergence is achieved, the worst-case run time
of the distributed algorithm is longer. However, the distributed algorithm comes with several
distinct advantages over the centralized version as described below.
In the centralized version, the detection occurs at the monitoring station. In the distributed
version, the detection occurs at each node in the network (which is a significant advantage in
large networks since localized mitigation actions can be applied faster and with knowledge of a
fuller local context unavailable to a distant monitoring station.) The distributed algorithm also
removes the communication and storage burden at the one monitoring station and distributes
it across all the nodes. As Table I shows, the communication at the monitoring station in the
centralized case is significantly higher than the communication at each of the nodes in the
distributed case — which is especially helpful in the midst of a severe congestion caused by a
distributed denial-of-service attack.
Storage needs for detection in both the centralized and distributed algorithms are primarily
that for storing the normal subspace data. The only difference is that, in algorithm GETESD-D,
the stored information is evenly distributed among the nodes in the network instead of being
concentrated at the monitoring station. In general, the monitoring station in GETESD has to
store N times as much data as each node in GETESD-D.
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VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given Big Data trends in both collection and storage, current state-of-the-art network traffic
analysis invariably deals with high-dimensional datasets of increasingly larger size — thus, it
is important to derive a low-dimensional structure as a compact representation of the original
dataset. In this paper, supported by theoretical analysis and simulation results using real traffic
traces, we have described a new distance-based approach to dimensionality reduction with distinct
advantages over previously known methods. These advantages include (i) improved adaptability
to changing patterns in test data so that we only use the number of dimensions necessary at any
given time, (ii) improved ability to characterize and classify attack traffic since the dimensionality
reduction is based on the observed traffic and not pre-determined, and (iii) improved resilience
against attacks which try to spoof normal traffic patterns.
Even though we illustrated our distance-based subspace approach through the end goal of
anomaly detection in networks, our contribution can be employed in any other network man-
agement context where dimensionality reduction of live network traffic is useful. The primary
technical contribution of this paper, therefore, is a new general distance-based method for real-
time dimensionality reduction in order to ease the Big Data challenges of network and system
management.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Without loss of generality, assume kA ≥ kB . The statement of the theorem is proved if
θkA,kB(A,B) ≤ θkB ,kB(A,B) and θkA,kB(A,B) ≤ θkA,kA(A,B). The proofs of each of these two
cases follows.
Case (i): Let x denote a column vector of length kB. Using the definition of matrix norm, we
have:
‖TkA,kB(A,B) ‖
2
= max
∀x,‖x‖=1
‖ TkA,kB(A,B)x ‖
2
= max
∀x,‖x‖=1
N∑
i=kA+1
‖ a′i[b1, . . . , bkB ]x ‖2
=
N∑
i=kA+1
‖ a′i[b1, . . . , bkB ]xmax ‖2
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where xmax is the column vector with unit norm that achieves the maximum matrix norm.
Similarly, using the definition of the matrix norm again:
‖TkB ,kB(A,B) ‖
2
= max
∀x,‖x‖=1
N∑
i=kB+1
‖ a′i[b1, . . . , bkB ]x ‖2
≥
N∑
i=kB+1
‖ a′i[b1, . . . , bkB ]xmax ‖2
≥
N∑
i=kA+1
‖ a′i[b1, . . . , bkB ]xmax ‖2=‖ TkA,kB(A,B) ‖2 .
Thus we have θkA,kB(A,B) ≤ θkB ,kB(A,B).
Case (ii): Let y denote a column vector of length kA. Using the definition of matrix norm:
‖TkA,kA(A,B) ‖
2= max
∀y,‖y‖=1
N∑
i=kA+1
‖ a′i[b1, . . . , bkA]y ‖2
Let z denote a column vector of length kA with xmax followed by kA − kB zeroes: z′ =
[xmax 0 · · ·0]
′
. This vector has unit norm and [b1, . . . , bkA]z = [b1, . . . , bkB ]xmax. Therefore,
‖ TkA,kA(A,B) ‖
2 ≥
N∑
i=kA+1
‖ a′i[b1, . . . , bkA]z ‖2
=
N∑
i=kA+1
‖ a′i[b1, . . . , bkB ]xmax ‖2= ‖ TkA,kB(A,B) ‖2 .
Thus we have θkA,kB(A,B) ≤ θkA,kA(A,B).

B. Proof of Theorem 2
First, we use Pi,j to express Tk,k(A,B) and T ′k,k(A,B)Tk,k(A,B).
Tk,k(A,B) = (I −
k∑
i=1
ai × a
′
i)[b1, . . . , bk]
= [b1, . . . , bk]−
k∑
i=1
ai × [a
′
ib1, . . . , a′ibk]
= [b1, . . . , bk]−
k∑
i=1
ai[Pi,1, . . . , Pi,k]
Similarly,
T ′k,k(A,B)Tk,k(A,B) = Ik×k − P
′
1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k
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A more detailed proof with all intermediate steps is provided in [37].
The value of sin(θk,k(A,B)), defined earlier as ‖ Tk,k(A,B) ‖, is the first singular value of
Tk,k(A,B) and also the square root of the largest eigenvalue of T ′k,k(A,B)Tk,k(A,B). Following
the previous analysis, therefore, we have:
sin2(θk,k(A,B)) = ‖ Tk,k(A,B) ‖
2
= σ21(Tk,k(A,B))
= λ1(T
′
k,k(A,B)Tk,k(A,B))
= λ1(Ik×k − P ′1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k)
= 1− λk(P
′
1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k)
= 1− σ2k(P1:k,1:k)
where λi stands for the i-th eigenvalue and σi for the i-th singular value. As a result, the following
holds:
cos(θk,k(A,B)) = σk(P1:k,1:k)

C. Proof of Theorem 3
Consider an N × N matrix P built as in Eq. (5). Let ui denote an N × 1 vector with i-th
entry being non-zero:
ui(k) =
{
1 if k = i
0 if k 6= i
Now, letting pi denote the i-th column of P , and letting IN×N denote an identity matrix of
size N ×N , we have:
u′iP
′Puj = p′ipj
=
N∑
k=1
Pk,iPk,j =
N∑
k=1
b′iaka′kbj
= b′i(
N∑
k=1
aka
′
k)bj = b′iIN×Nbj = b′ibj
Therefore, we have
u′iP
′Puj =
{
1 if i = j
0 if i 6= j (9)
Now, for simplicity, denote P1:k,1:k as Pk. We prove the result in Theorem 3 by first proving
that σ1(Pk) > σ1(Pk−1) and then proving that σ1(Pk) ≤ 1.
To prove that σ1(Pk) > σ1(Pk−1), note that:
Pk =
[
Pk−1 u
v′ c
]
(10)
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where u′ = [a′1bk, . . . , a′k−1bk], v′ = [a′kb1, . . . , a′kbk−1], and c = a′kbk. Then, P ′kPk can be
constructed as follows:
P ′kPk =
[
P ′k−1 v
u′ c
] [
Pk−1 u
v′ c
]
=
[
P ′k−1Pk−1 + vv
′ P ′k−1u + cv
u′Pk−1 + cv′ u′u + c2
]
(11)
Since σ1(Pk) is the first singular value of Pk, it implies the following: first, σ21(Pk) is an
eigenvalue of P ′kPk, i.e., P ′kPkzk = σ21(Pk)zk, where zk is the corresponding eigenvector with
unit norm; second, ‖ Pkz ‖≤ σ1(Pk) for any vector z with unit norm. Thus, we have:
σ21(Pk) ≥
[
z′k−1 0
]
P ′kPk
[
zk−1
0
]
=
[
z′k−1 0
] [P ′k−1Pk−1zk−1 + vv′zk−1
u′Pk−1zk−1 + cv′zk−1
]
= z′k−1P
′
k−1Pk−1zk−1 + z
′
k−1vv
′zk−1
= z′k−1σ
2
1(Pk−1)zk−1 + (v
′zk−1)2
≥ σ21(Pk−1)z
′
k−1zk−1
= σ21(Pk−1)
Since σ1(Pk) is non-negative, we have σ1(Pk) ≥ σ1(Pk−1).
Now, to prove that σ1(Pk) ≤ 1, note that for any x ∈ RN×1 with unit norm, we can represent
it as a linear combination of ui, x =
∑N
k=1 xiui, with
∑N
k=1 x
2
i = 1. Using the result from
Equation (9), we have
‖ Px ‖2 = x′P ′Px
=
(
N∑
i=1
xiu
′
i
)
P ′P
N∑
j=1
xjuj
=
N∑
i=1
(
N∑
j=1
xixju
′
iP
′Puj
)
=
N∑
i=1
(
x2i
)
= 1
Therefore, σ1(P ) = · · · = σN (P ) and σ1(P ) = max ‖ Px ‖= 1. As a result,
σ1(Pk) ≤ σ1(PN) = σ1(P ) = 1

D. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 3 above demonstrates that one can construct a projection matrix in
search of the optimal subspace dimension. First, based on Equations (10) and (11), let’s look at
the computational complexity of constructing P1:k,1:k and P ′1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k with the knowledge of
P ′1:k−1,1:k−1P1:k−1,1:k−1 and a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk.
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The complexity of calculating u, v and c is O(kN). The complexity of constructing P ′1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k
is O(k2).
Now, the complexity of calculating the eigenvalue of P ′1:k,1:kP1:k,1:k using power iteration
method is O(Zk2) with Z being the number of iterations necessary for convergence. Since
k < N , the overall complexity of algorithm GETESD in k loops is O(Zk3 + k2N).

E. Proof of Theorem 5
The most computationally expensive part is in calculating z(k)n . When the size of measurements
is M , the length of x′nv
(k)
n is also M . Assuming the maximum degree of each node is ∆, then
the process of average consensus in S steps has complexity of O(∆S) for each entry of x′nv
(k)
n .
Overall, the computational complexity of the distributed power iteration method running for p
steps is O(pM∆S). As a result, the overall computational complexity of GETESD-D using O(k)
power iterations is O(kpM∆S).

F. Proof of Theorem 6
We consider the number of messages that one node needs to send when the algorithm is
running. Again, let the maximum degree of each node be ∆. At the very step, the node needs to
send its observation xn to its neighbors, leading to communication cost of O(M∆). After that,
this node only needs to update its neighbors about its estimate v(k)n . The number of messages sent
for each power iteration is O(∆S). Overall, the communication complexity of the distributed
power iteration method running for p steps is O(M∆ + p∆S). The overall communication
complexity of GETESD-D using O(k) power iterations is O(kM∆ + kp∆S).

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